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Abstract
We compare the quantitative risk of infection from short range air-
borne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to the long-range risk from aerosol
transmission in an enclosed space. We use mathematical techniques
to show that the risk is approximately inversley proportional to the
ventilation rate per person in the space. To estimate the constant
of proportionality, we use recent work by Chen et al. [2] modelling
the viral load received at a distance of 1 meter and compare this to
estimates of the total aerosolized viral load.
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1 Introduction
There are believed to be four transmission routes for severe acute respira-
tory syndrome-coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): touching an infected person,
fomites (touching an infected surface), aerial transmission by droplets, and
aerial transmission by aerosols. Recently there have been growing calls to
take aerosol transmission into account when assessing COVID-19 risks in-
doors [7], and on 9 July 2020, the W.H.O. said [10] “There have been re-
ported outbreaks of COVID-19 in some closed settings, such as restaurants,
nightclubs, places of worship or places of work where people may be shouting,
talking, or singing. In these outbreaks, aerosol transmission, particularly in
these indoor locations where there are crowded and inadequately ventilated
spaces where infected persons spend long periods of time with others, cannot
be ruled out. More studies are urgently needed to investigate such instances
and assess their significance for transmission of COVID-19.”
It is hard to quantitatively compare risks from different routes. There
have been a small number of studies, such as [1], that fit parameters to some
specific events where a large number of infections are known to have occurred.
However, it is hard to account for the sample bias here—if one analyzes only
super-spreader events, estimates of infection risk will be inflated.
The purpose of this note is to try to compare the relative viral loads that
somebody would receive from exposure to an infectious person standing close
to them and the amount they would receive via aerosols in an indoor envi-
ronment where they remain for a long time (such as a class-room, airplane,
indoor stadium). These can be thought of as short-range and long-range
aerial transmission. For convenience, we shall refer to short-range transmis-
sion as droplet borne, and long-range as aerosol borne, even though aerosols
contribute to the short range transmission as well [2]. Our main conclusion
(see equation (3) in Section 2) is that the long-range risk is approximately
proportional to 1/F , where F is the total volume of air exchanged by the
ventilation system per person per minute (and it is essential that the air re-
moved is either vented or disinfected, not merely recirculated with the virus
still in it). Indeed, from equation (3) we have that LRR, the long-range risk,
in terms of virions inhaled per minute, is approximately
LRR ≈
Iv
F
pi, (1)
where pi is the proportion of the people in the enclosure who are infectious, I
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is the breathing rate per minute, and v is the number of virions per minute
that an infectious person exhales that become aerosolized.
Currently, v is not known, nor is the risk of infection arising from inhaling
a given viral load. So to compare (1) to the short range risk SRR, the risk
from direct exposure to a person 1m away, even approximately, we need to
make some assumptions. We shall use the results of [2], where the authors
estimate what fraction of exhaled saliva is inhaled by another person standing
one meter away, face-to-face. We shall then estimate what fraction of exhaled
saliva becomes aerosolized, and look at the ratio. Our conclusion (equation
(4)) is that the relative risk ρ of long-range aerosol transmission to short-
range droplet exposure from one person 1 meter away is roughly c/F , where
F is measured in liters per person per minute,
ρ = LRR/SRR ≈
c
F
. (2)
We estimate c to be between 6 and 2000, provided that infected people are
not coughing or sneezing (see Section 4). The numerator increases dramati-
cally if infectious people are coughing or sneezing. Sneezing once per minute
increases the aerosol load by a factor of around 50, in addition to increasing
the short-range risk.
We emphasize that while we think the functional form of (2) is approxi-
mately correct — the risk will vary like the reciprocal of the venilation rate
per person — we are not confident that the numerical value of c that we esti-
mate is accurate, even to an order of magnitude. It will take experimentation
to find a good value for the numerator.
2 Aerosols
Let v be the number of aerosolized virions produced by one infectious person
per minute. Let A(t) be the total number of virions in aerosol form in the air
at time t. Let k be the fraction of air removed every minute. With complete
mixing, we would get
dA
dt
= v − kA,
whose solution is
A(t) =
v
k
(1− e−kt).
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So we shall assume that an upper bound for A(t) is the equilibrium value of
v
k
.
Let V be the volume of the indoor region (in liters). The concentration
dispersed in the air is then bounded by
v
kV
.
Note that kV is the total volume of air extracted per minute; let us call this
E. Let I be the volume of air a person inhales per minute (approximately
10 liters). We conclude that an approximate upper bound on how much a
person inhales from a long-range source is
Iv
E
Let nt be the number of people in attendance, and ni the number of those who
are infected. Let pi = ni/nt be the fraction of attendees who are infectious.
We get that the long-range risk is then
LRR =
Iv
E
ni
Let F = E/nt be the volume of air exchanged per person per minute. We
conclude that
LRR =
Iv
F
pi. (3)
A more sophistiated analysis of aerosol infection risks has been done in
[1].
3 Droplets
When an infected person exhales (or coughs or sneezes) they spray droplets of
saliva that contain the virus into the air. The larger ones remain as droplets,
and either collide with a person, land on a surface, or fall to the ground.
The smaller ones become aerosolized and waft through the air, where they
can remain for hours. During this time they can travel a long distance, and
potentially be inhaled by a distant person.
We shall assume that the viral concentration in droplets is independent
of their size. Small droplets will rapidly evaporate, but since we wish to
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compare the viral load of aerosolized droplets to that of larger droplets,
when we speak of volume we will always mean the volume of the droplet at
the time of exhalation.
In [2], the authors analyze short-range droplet transmission, based on a
mathematical model. They argue that there are two main routes of short-
range non-fomite transmission: large droplets that are projected directly into
the mouth, nose and eyes of a nearby facing person at the same height (they
ignore droplets that hit any other part of the face or body), and small droplets
that enter the air stream and are inhaled. Large droplets are intrinsically
short-range, because gravity pulls them down to the floor in a short period of
time. (If coughed out, they can travel a long distance horizontally however).
They conclude that mid-size droplets (defined as having initial diameters
75-400 µm) fall to the ground within a meter. Smaller droplets follow the
air-stream; larger ones decelerate horizontally more slowly, so travel farther,
but will settle to the ground. Moreover, they conclude that at distances over
0.3m (talking) and over 0.8m (coughing) the majority of exposure comes
from inhaled droplets rather than deposited droplets.
For their base data, [2] use a paper by Duguid [3] who measured the
number and size of droplets exhaled by a person coughing, and by counting
loudly from 1 to 100. The latter produced a total measured volume of saliva
of 0.36 µL (of which 2×10−3 µL came from droplets with a diameter less than
75µm). The conclusion of [2] that we will use as an anchor for short-range
aerial transmission is that face-to-face, at a range of 1m, a person inhales
6.2 × 10−6 µL of the original 0.36 µL of the talking emission, almost all of
it from droplets smaller than 75 µm.
To calculate the volume that becomes aerosolized, we shall use Duguid’s
measurements of what fraction of droplets of a give size remain airborne after
10 minutes; this was 88% for droplets 0.5-1 µm, 7% for 1-2 µm, and down to
11% for droplets 8-10 µm in diameter.
4 Long range risk comparison to short range
How do we compare LRR from (3) to the short-range risk from Section 3?
Instead of v, let us work with b, the volume of droplets a person exhales per
minute that become aerosolized. Then we want to compare
Ib
F
pi
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to the volume of droplets inhaled from direct transmission from a meter away.
Let us make some numerical assumptions.
1. Duguid doesn’t record the time it takes to count loudly to 100; we shall
assume it took 100 seconds = 1.67 minutes. So we shall assume that
the amount of saliva inhaled by the direct route at 1 meter is 0.6 times
the figure from [2], i.e. 3.7× 10−6 µL/min.
2. Duguid measures the number and size of droplets emitted by a sneeze,
and how many of them remain after 10, 20, 30, and more minutes.
We shall assume that the proportion of droplets that remain after 10
minutes are the ones that become aerosolized. This is of course an
over-estimate, since some of these will settle out in the next 10 minutes.
While 88% of droplets of diameter 0.5-1 µm remained airborne after
10 minutes, only 11% of those with diameters 8-10 µm remained, and
none larger. Applying these percentages to Duguid’s size distributions
of droplets produced by counting, we would get that 3.5 × 10−6 µL of
the 0.36 µL of total volume would become aerosolized, or 2.1 × 10−6
µL/minute. We will therefore use this estimate for b:
b = 2.1× 10−6µL/min.
With these assumptions, and taking I = 10 L/min, we get
LRR =
2.1× 10−5
F
pi.
The short-range risk per minute at one meter SRR is the volume of saliva
inhaled times the probability pi that the source is infected. So we get
SRR = 3.7× 10−6pi.
When we divide these the pi’s cancel, and we get the estimate for ρ, the ratio
of the long-range risk from aerosol transmission to short-range risk from
facing someone at 1 meter to be
ρ = LRR/SRR ≈
6
F
. (4)
Sneezing releases much greater quantities of droplets of all sizes. Using
the same methodology and Duguid’s count of the number of droplets of
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different sizes produced by a sneeze, we get that 30 times the volume will be
aerosolized from a sneeze than from counting from 1 to 100. If the sneeze
occurs once per minute, this would yield an increase by a factor of 50
ρsneezing ≈
300
F
. (5)
Of course, if an infected person is sneezing, the short-range risk also increases
dramatically; but (5) shows that even if the sneezing person is isolated at a
sufficient distance that no sneezed droplets hit anybody else, they still add
greatly to the aerosol risk. (So, for example, if someone is alone in an elevator,
sneezes, and then somebody else enters, they are at greatly increased risk).
Let us note that the recent paper [9] measures droplets emitted by speech,
and comes up with a very much larger estimate than Duguid. They estimate
that the total volume of emitted droplets under 21 µm in diameter is 0.1 to
0.7 µL/minute, compared to the 10−4 µL/minute estimate of Duguid. As
the paper [2] uses Duguid’s results as input, if the actual number of droplets
in each size range scaled uniformly with Duguid’s measurements, this would
not affect the ratio in our conclusion. If Duguid undercounted small droplets
more (which is almost certain), this would affect our conclusion. Since most
of the volume of the aerosolized droplets in [9] comes from droplets in the
12-21 µm diameter range, and not from the large number but small volume
of droplets in the below 4 µm range that were largely missed in older studies
[8], we may hope that the correction does not completely invalidate our
conclusion. (As [9] does not measure numbers of larger droplets, we cannot
feed their data into the [2] model).
To get an upper bound on c, we use the following calculation from [2].
They estimate that of all the droplets of diameter less than 50 µm emitted,
the fraction that enter the air-stream and are inhaled at 1m is 4.9 × 10−3.
Only counting these droplets, and not larger ones, understimates the short-
range risk. Let R be the actual volume of aerosolized droplets emitted per
minute that are under 50 µm in diameter (so R is some fraction of b). Let q be
the fraction of these droplets (calculated by volume) that become aerosolized.
Then from the estimates
SRR > 4.9× 10−3Rpi
LRR =
IRqpi
F
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we get
ρ < 2× 102
Iq
F
. (6)
Taking I = 10 as before, and noting that we must have q ≤ 1, we get
c < 2000. (7)
We get estimates, then, that c is between 6 and 2000. Since q is likely to
be much smaller than 1 (unless nearly all of the volume of exhaled droplets
is in the sub 10 micron range), we expect that c will turn out to be much
closer to 6 than to 2000.
5 Other comparisons
To get a feel for what this says in practice, let us take c = 10 and I = 10 in
this section.
A recommended air exchange rate is 8 liters per person per second, which
is 480 liters per person per minute. If this were applied, we would get ρ = 0.02
at full occupancy, and lower at reduced occupancy rates.
In [6] a restaurant in Guangzhou is studied, where on January 24, 2020,
5 people sitting at adjacent tables to a person who was infected developed
CoVid-19. This case has also been described and analyzed in [4, Sec. 33]
and [1]. The air conditioning did not vent the air, so the air-exchange rate
was very low (estimated at 0.56-0.77 exchanges per hour). The relevant part
of the restaurant had 21 people, and an area of 45 m2. If we assume the
volume is 90 m3, this gives an F of about 48 L/min. This would yield a ρ of
.2 if the infected person were not coughing or sneezing. Since this occurred
before the pandemic was recognized, it is possible that the infected person
did cough or sneeze during the meal, which would greatly increase ρ as noted
above.
Elevators have different ventilation requirements. Some states require
“adequate means of ventilation”, without specifying what adequate is. The
state of Washington [5] requires them to have a ventilation of 1 cubic foot/minute
per square foot (which is 1 foot/minute). At 1.5 square feet per person in
the cab, 1 cfm/ft2 would yield an F of 42 L/min, and a ρ of .24.
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6 Limitations
Our result (1) assumes perfect mixing. More likely is that being closer to
the sources elevates the risk. It also assumes that the equilibrium level is
reached quickly. This will over-estimate the risk especially in high-ceilinged
environments for short durations.
The lack of direct measurements of inhaled saliva at different distances
from a source, coupled with uncertainty on how much virus load becomes
aerosolized, required us to make a string of assumptions to try to find c in
(2). We do not believe that the value of c as 6 is close to correct—we wanted
to suggest one way to get at the order of magnitude, which as explained
above we would guess to be of the order of 101. We would welcome any
improvements to this estimate.
7 Notation
A Total number of virions in aerosols in the air
b Hydrated volume of droplets exhaled by an individual talking for one
minute.
E Total volume of clean air brought in by the ventilation system (in
Liters per minute)
F Total volume of clean air brought in by the ventilation system per
person in attendance (in Liters per minute) = E
nt
I Breathing rate (in Liters per minute)
LRR Long range risk = Number of aerosolized virions inhaled per
minute, assuming infectious people are talking, not coughing or sneezing
LRRsneezing Number of aerosolized virions inhaled per minute, assum-
ing infectious people are sneezing once per minute
k Fraction of the air that is replaced by the ventilation system per
minute
ni Number of infectious people present
nt Total number of people present
q Fraction of emitted droplets under 50 µm in diameter that become
aerosolized (weighted by volume)
R Hydrated volume of droplets smaller than 50 µm exhaled by an
individual talking for one minute.
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SRR Short range risk = Number of virions inhaled per minute when
talking face to face with an infectious person
t Time (measured in minutes)
v Number of aerosolized virions produced by one infectious person per
minute
V Total volume of enclosure (in Liters)
pi Fraction of attendants who are infectious = ni
nt
ρ The ratio LRR/SRR
ρsneezing The ratio LRRsneezing/SRR
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